

IPv6 Topology Mapping

Robert Beverly^{*}, Ram Durairajan[†], Justin Rohrer^{*}, David Plonka[‡]

^{*}Naval Postgraduate School

[†]University of Oregon

[‡]Akamai

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Context

This talk:

- Really a bunch of slides for informal discussion
- Planned IMC 2018 submission
- Looking for feedback/suggestions, especially on:
 - Motivation
 - Analysis/metrics/result interpretation



Problem

What is the topology of the IPv6 Internet?

Motivation:

- Understanding Internet topology is important (CDNs, security, resilience, diagnostics, research)
- IPv6 increasingly important (e.g., by metrics of traffic, enabled sites, edge deployment)
- But, do we have a good understanding of the IPv6 topology?



Prior Work

State-of-the-art:

- CAIDA has been collecting IPv6 topology maps for 10 years
- Essentially replicates their IPv4 probing methodology
- For every IPv6 prefix in the global BGP table*:
 - Use scamper (active measurement using ICMP6-Paris)
 - Traceroute to `::1` in prefix
 - Traceroute to random host in prefix
 - Takes approximately 9 hours for $< 100k$ targets (!)
- *March 5, 2018: probed 98,120 unique destinations; 1,782 destinations probed more than once (one probed six times)

Coverage/Completeness/Efficiency of state-of-art IPv6 topology maps has not been evaluated

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A different approach for IPv6?

Strategies for increasing coverage:

- Probe more destinations
- Probe faster
- Select better destinations

Probing faster:

RFC4443, §2.1.1: *“an IPv6 node MUST limit the rate of ICMPv6 error messages it originates”*

Assertion:

Existing tools/techniques ill-suited to IPv6 active topology mapping



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Our approach:

- 1 Explore use of recent randomized, high-speed active topology probing techniques (Yarrp)
- 2 Develop IPv6 version of Yarrp
- 3 Evaluate efficacy of various hitlists, targets, and protocols
- 4 Goal: Produce the most complete IPv6 topology currently available



Yarrp

Yarrp: “Yelling at Random Routers Progressively” (IMC2016)

- <https://www.cmand.org/yarrp/>
- Uses a block cipher to **randomly permute** the $\langle IP, TTL \rangle$ domain
- Is **stateless**, recovering necessary information from replies
- By randomly spreading probes, permits **fast** Internet-scale active topology probing
 - (Runs $> 300kpps$, discovers $> 0.5M$ ints in $< 10min$ from single VP)

Hypothesis: Yarrp-mapping of the IPv6 Internet will suffer less rate-limiting, even at higher probing rates

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Yarrp Features Update

Lots of development since the 2016 IMC yarrp-0.1.

yarrp-0.4:

- TCP (SYN or ACK), UDP, or ICMP probes
- IPv4/IPv6
- Linux and BSD
- “Fill mode”
- Decoupled probing / receiving
- Biased probing
- Better usability / documentation



IPv6: Encoding State (new)


RFC4443, §3.3: ICMP6 TTL exceeded quotation includes “*As much of invoking packet as possible without the ICMPv6 packet exceeding the minimum IPv6 MTU*”

- In contrast to IPv4 which only guarantees 28B quote
- Significantly simplifies encoding – place in payload!



Yarrp6

IPv6: Encoding State



- Maintain constant transport (TCP/UDP/ICMP) header fields
- Encode TTL, elapsed time in transport payload
- Use 2B of “fudge” to correct payload so that checksum is correct

Fill Mode

Yarrp is stateless

- Must select TTL range ($maxTTL$) (potentially missing hops)
- Don't know when to stop probing (potentially wasting probes)
- (can be beneficial, as we discover hops beyond gap limit)

Fill mode

For response to a probe with $TTL=h$, probe with $TTL=h + 1$ iff $h \geq maxTTL$. (not random, but uncommon and at path tail)

Win/win efficiency gain: Allows us to lower the $maxTTL$ (less wasted probing), without missing hops.



SPECK

SPECK

- Use SPECK lightweight block cipher
- Faster, and supports intermediate block lengths (e.g., 48 and 96 bits – useful for IPv6-wide scanning)



Target Selection

- Must select IPv6 target addresses
- For 128-bit IPv6 address:
 - How to choose prefix? (Upper 64 bits)
 - How to host identifier? (Lower 64 bits)



Choosing prefixes

Basic strategies

- **Uniform:** probe all possible prefixes (generally infeasible)
- **Random:** chose prefixes at random (IPv6 space is too sparse)
- **BGP:** Select prefixes in global BGP table (does not capture subnetting)
- **Hitlists:** Select prefixes based on hitlists (utility/comparison of hitlists has not been previously explored in literature)
- **Generative:** Build a model of how prefixes are allocated using seeds of known addresses, generate new candidate prefixes (has not been previously explored in literature)



Hitlists

Name	Size	Method
CAIDA	93,894	BGP-derived
Fiebig	97,746	rDNS
Rapid7	196,012	fDNS
CDN Clients	372,930	Anonymous aggregates
DNS-DB	Varies	Farsight
6gen	Varies	Generative

- Lots of recent work on IPv6 hitlist/target generation
- No work to compare/understand these hitlists!
- Note, many hitlists have many addresses within same /64
 - We reduce these to unique /48s
 - (unlikely to produce interesting topology results)

Hitlists

Fiebig

- Intuition: leverage rDNS, i.e., IPv6 PTR records
- Recall, IPv6 PTR records are in the `ip6.arpa` namespace. Text hex nibbles separated by periods.
- e.g., `0.0.1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.1.0.0.0.1.2.c.0.7.0.f.1.0.7.4.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.`
`3600 IN PTR ralph.rbeverly.net.`
- Trick: recent DNS standard specifies that resolvers respond to partial PTR queries with:
 - NXDOMAIN: no record and nothing under in the tree
 - NOERROR: children in the tree
- Permits (efficient) enumeration of the namespace
- Assumes providers populate the portion of the `ip6.arpa` hierarchy they are authoritative for

Hitlists

Rapid7

- scans.io performs regular internet-wide IPv4 service scans (e.g., web servers)
- Hitlist generated from AAAA queries for all names discovered



Hitlists

CDN clients

- Obtained in cooperation with Akamai
- Contains “anonymous aggregates” – prefixes based on the IPv6 addresses of clients that query the Akamai CDN platform
- Grouped in prefix aggregates such that the prefix is more specific than the BGP prefix, but has enough clients within it so that they remain anonymous



Hitlists

6gen

- Murdock et al. , IMC 2017: “*Target Generation for Internet-wide IPv6 Scanning*”
- Takes a set of input addresses (seed), attempts to learn the addressing structure
- Generates candidate addresses



Hitlists

Coverage distribution comparison




Figure: Cumulative targets per routed prefix

Hitlists

Coverage distribution comparison




Figure: Cumulative targets per routed /48

Hitlists

Coverage distribution comparison




Figure: Cumulative targets per routed /64

Host identifier

Explored two strategies

- Probe `::1`
- Probe `1234:5678:1234:5678`



Initial Active IPv6 Probing Results

Vantage Points:



- NPS
- UOregon
- Swiss IXP

Probed:

- Different speeds
- Different hitlists
- Different prefixes/hosts
- Different protocols



Benefit of randomization



NPS

- Same targets, same vantage point
- Yarp outperforms scamper, especially near source
- Clearly some hops exhibit different rate-limiting behavior (lax-agg6-lax-hpr3-100g.cenic.net. and 3.be-1.uonet9-gw.uoregon.edu.)


UOregon

Different Router Behaviors


- Clearly some hops exhibit different rate-limiting behavior
- `3.be-1.uonet9-gw.uoregon.edu.`
- Queried owner, is a Cisco ASR9000
- *“It’s going to be replaced with a Juniper MX10003 some time in the next month or so. We’re not doing anything special beyond ACLs and Netflow sampling on those router interfaces”*



Probe Type



NPS



UOregon

Take-away:

- Marginal difference; ICMP/UDP most innocuous




Host identifier

ICMP6 response types


type/code	CDN		Fiebig
	::1	1234:5678	
Hop lim	3598838 (98.1%)	3530329 (98.1%)	380089 (95.8%)
No route	26728 (0.7%)	26039 (0.7%)	2454 (0.6%)
Adm prohib	23595 (0.6%)	21080 (0.6%)	1696 (0.4%)
Addr unrch	12158 (0.3%)	14781 (0.4%)	2631 (0.7%)
Port unrch	5250 (0.1%)	1045 (0.0%)	9084 (2.3%)
Reject rte	2577 (0.1%)	6279 (0.2%)	818 (0.2%)

Hitlist evaluation

IPv6 Hitlist Topo Comparison (Ints)
rapid7




IPv6 Hitlist Topo Comparison (Edges)
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Take-away:


- Missing topology in state-of-the-art
- Hitlists are complementary

Hitlist Power



- Again, very complementary behavior

Subnetting



- How many distinct paths to different targets within same routed prefix?
- Use as a basic proxy for amount of subnetting

Outstanding questions/work:



- How to best evaluate hitlists (counts, graph metrics, subnetting, etc)?
- Characterize discovered topology (ASes, edge/core, etc)
- Resolve aliases, determine how many new routers discovered
- Combining hitlists
- Creating the definitive “topology-of-record” for IPv6





Path diameters

Distribution of interfaces over all VPs




IPv4

IPv6

- Interesting skew toward smaller diameters in IPv6
- Likely due to tunneling (e.g., Hurricane Electric)
- And relative size of big IPv6 ASes

Biased Probability



Given the distribution of routers vs. TTL

- Use different probability distributions to bias the search

Current Option Summary


OPTIONS:

-i, --input	Input target file
-o, --output	Output file (default: output.yrp)
-c, --count	Probes to issue (default: unlimited)
-t, --type	Type: ICMP, TCP_SYN, TCP_ACK, UDP, ICMP6, UDP6, TCP6_SYN, TCP6_ACK (default: ICMP)
-r, --rate	Scan rate in pps (default: 10)
-m, --maxttl	Maximum TTL (for ip input list only)
-v, --verbose	verbose (default: off)
-F, --fillmode	Fill mode maxttl (default: 0)
-s, --sequential	Scan sequentially (default: random)
-n, --neighborhood	Neighborhood TTL (default: 0)
-b, --bgp	BGP table (default: none)
-S, --seed	Seed (default: random)
-p, --port	Transport dst port (default: 80)
-T, --test	Don't send probes (default: off)
-Q, --entire	Entire IPv4/IPv6 Internet (default: off)
-I, --interface	Network interface (required for IPv6)
-G, --dstmac	MAC of gateway router (default: auto)
-M, --srcmac	MAC of probing host (default: auto)



Internet-Wide Probing

Forming an IPv6 target



- Use 48-bit Speck block cipher
- First 4-bit nibble fixed (IANA allocation of 0×2)
- Add 44 bits of cipher to form /48 prefix to probe
- Lower 32 bits a deterministic function of /48 prefix
- Remaining 4 bits of cipher determine TTL (1-16)

